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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, )
)




GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC., )
)
Defendant and /^pellant. )" )
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On March 14, 1990 Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed an amended 
complaint for damages against Globe International, Inc., 
Roundtable Publishing, Inc., and Robert Morrow in Los Angeles 
Superior Court. (C.T. 137.) Khawar's claim against Globe was 
for libel stemming from an article Globe published on April 4, 
1989. (C.T. 139.)
With regard to Khawar's claim, the jury found: (1) that the 
article was of and concerning Khawar; (2) that the article
1
contained false and defamatory statements about Khawar; (3) that 
Khawar was a private figure; (4) that Globe published the 
defamatory material either knowing that it was false, or with 
reckless disregard as to the truth of the charges; (5) that 
Globe published the article with malice or oppression towards 
Khawar; and (6) the article was an neutral and accurate report 
of the charges made by Morrow. (C.T. 2780-83.) The court 
awarded Khawar a total of $1,175,000 in damages, including an 
award of $500,000 for punitive damages. (C.T. 2783, 2791.)
The trial court upheld all of the jury's findings, except
V
the court determined that the Globe article was not an accurate 
and neutral report. (R.T. 2740.) The basis of the court's 
decision was that the photo in the article was lighter and larger 
than the same picture in the book. (R.T. 2744.) The court 
stated that because Khawar was identifiable only in Globe's 
picture, this constituted original libel. (R.T. 2744.) In spite 
of the fact that Khawar offered no evidence on this point, the 
court stated that the jury would have decided differently had 
Khawar offered such evidence. (R.T. 2743.)
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Khawar on April 
15, 1994. (C.T. 3310.) Globe appealed, and the Second District
Court of Appeal upheld the trial court. Khawar v. Globe Int'l, 
Cal. App. 4th 14 (1996), review granted September 25,
1996 {S046116). The appellate court held: (1) that the trial 
court properly determined that Khawar was a private figure; (2)
2
that California has not adopted the neutral reportage privilege;
and (3) that the jury's finding of malice was supported by
substantial evidence. See Khawar, 51 Cal, App. 4th at 14. This
Court accepted Globe's petition for review on September 25, 1996. 
(C.T. X.)
Statement of Facts
Khawar testified that he was at the Ambassador Hotel to take 
photographs on the night Robert Kennedy was killed, June 4, 1968. 
{R.T. 1338.) Khawar gave his camera to another man, and went to 
the podium to pose near Kennedy moments before the Senator was 
shot. (R.T. 1339-40.) The police and the FBI interviewed Khawar 
after the assassination, and he gave his name as Khalid Iqbal to 
both agencies. (R.T. 1381.) Khawar left the country for 
Pakistan on November 6, 1968. (R.T. 1351.) A woman subsequently
identified Khawar as ''Ali Ahmand" from a Time magazine photo, 
according to a December 2, 1968 FBI report. (R.T.1401.)
Khawar attempted to sell pictures he took the night Kennedy 
was killed to magazine. (R.T. 1394-95.) Khawar saw himself
on television year in and year out on programs concerning the 
Kennedy assassination, and he had videotape of the footage.
(R.T. 1393.) Time magazine published a picture of Khawar 
intentionally posing near Robert Kennedy on the podium. (R.T. 
1392.) Khawar kept a copy of this same picture in his office, 
which he often showed to family, friends, and employees. (R.T.
3
1357-58.) Khawar estimated that "at least a couple thousand" 
people had seen the picture. (R.T. 1359.)
In a book titled RFK Must Die, Robert Blair Kaiser 
questioned the identity of Khawar, why he had been so close to 
Kennedy, and why he had not been interviewed in Pakistan. (R.T. 
1409.) Subsequently, Morrow wrote a book in 1988 entitled The 
Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert F. Kennedy, in which he 
argued that Sirhan Sirhan did not kill Kennedy, and that the 
murderer was actually a Mafia hit man named Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 
143-44.) Morrow's book contained photographs that he purported
V
to be "photographs of Ali Ahmand". (R.T. 156, 162-63.) However, 
the photographs were actually pictures of Khawar standing on a 
podium next to Robert Kennedy just before his assassination,
(R.T. 2743.)
On April 4, 1989, Globe published a report entitled "Former 
CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA." 
(C.T. 3145.) The report covered the contents of Morrow's book, 
including the allegations that Robert Kennedy was killed by Ali 
Ahmand. (C.T. 3145.) The article contained one of the pictures 
of Khawar and Kennedy from the book with an arrow pointing to 
Khawar, indicating that he was the roan that Morrow claimed 
assassinated Robert Kennedy. (C.T. 3145.) Globe never referred 
to any person named Khalid Khawar, but instead named Ali Ahmand 
as the man in the photograph that Morrow claimed assassinated 
Robert Kennedy. (C.T. 3145.)
4
I
Of the eighteen paragraphs in the report, fifteen contained 
language such as "a former CIA agent charges," "Morrow claims," 
or "he says," which indicated that they were Morrow's claims. 
(C.T. 3145.) Of the three remaining paragraphs of the report, 
two were direct quotations from Morrow, (R.T. 1104.), and the 
third contained only undisputed facts about the assassination. 
(C.T. 3145.) Even the caption under the photograph attributed 





1. Did Khawar's intentional actions, the circumstances 
surrounding the Robert Kennedy assassination, and the 
publication of Robert Morrow's book indicating Khawar was the 
assassin, make Khawar a limited purpose public figure?
2. Did Khawar meet the substantial burden of showing that Globe 
published its article with actual malice?
3. Should this Court adopt the constitutional doctrine of the 
neutral reportage privilege in libel actions?
4. Does the neutral reportage privilege apply to Globe's 




4 Khawar is an involuntary public figure for the limited
purpose of the controversy around the assassination of Robert 
Kennedy. Khawar's affirmative actions, the subsequent 
\ publication of a photograph of Khawar standing near the Senator
just before his assassination, and the publicity surrounding the 
event made Khawar an involuntary public figure.
Because a public figure must prove actual malice to recover
damages for libel, Khawar must meet this requirement. Even
private figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice to recover
>•
punitive damages. To prove actual malice, a plaintiff must show 
that the statements were published with knowledge that they were 
false, or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 
The evidence Khawar presented at trial is only sufficient to 
support a finding of negligence, which is not probative of actual 
malice. Khawar's evidence was insufficient to prove actual 
malice, therefore the award of punitive damages must be reversed. 
Moreover, because Khawar is an involuntary public figure, this 
Court must reverse the award of actual damages.
Additionally, Globe is protected by the neutral reportage 
privilege, which the United States and California Constitutions 
compel this Court to adopt. This privilege applies to the 
neutral and accurate republication of charges which are against a 
public figure and which concern a newsworthy controversy. At 
trial, the jury concluded the Globe report was a neutral and
I 7
Khawar isaccurate statement of the accusations against Khawar. 
a limited purpose public figure for the controversy around 
Kennedy's assassination, and this controversy is newsworthy. The 
Globe report meets all parts of the neutral reportage privilege. 
For all the reasons discussed above, this Court should overturn 
the lower court decision.
ARGUMENT
I. KHAWAR'S PRESENCE AT THE PODIUM, THE EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
THE ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT KENNEDY, AND THE PUBLICATION OF 
MORROW'S BOOK HAVE MADE KHAWAR A PUBLIC FIGURE.
The question of whether a person is a public figure or not
is a question of law that must be reviewed ^ novo. See Wolston
V. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 167 (1979).
A. The United States Supreme Court created three
different categories of public figures that must show 
actual malice to recover in a libel suit.
In 1964, The United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
press has a privilege in holding that a "public official" could 
not recover damages for libel unless he proved actual malice by 
the defendant. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 
(1964). Later the Court extended this protection to charges 
against all "public figures." Curtis Publ'q Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 154 (1967). In 1974, the Court laid out three classes 
of public figures, explaining who was and how one became a public 
figure. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
8
The first type of public figure, general purpose public 
figures, are those people that "occupy positions of such 
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public 
figures for all purposes." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Khawar does 
not occupy such a position in society and is not a general 
purpose public figure.
The second and most common group of public figures 
established in Gertz are those "that have thrust themselves" into 
the public spotlight in a particular area or controversy. Id. 
These people become limited purpose public figures for this
V-
"limited range of issues." Id. at 351.
The final category of public figures Gertz created is termed 
the involuntary limited purpose public figure. Id. at 345.
These people become public figures "through no purposeful action 
of" their own. Id. The Gertz court did caution that involuntary 
public figures would have to be "exceedingly rare." Id. Because 
Khawar's acts placed him in the center of such an important 
event, he became an involuntary limited purpose public figure.
B. The circumstances surrounding the Robert Kennedy
assassination had the cumulative effect of making
Khawar one of the rare cases of a person becoming an
involuntary public figure.
1. Although the cases of involuntary public
figures have turned out to be rare as the Gertz
court predicted, there have been cases clearly
indicating when such a finding is appropriate.
Courts did not use the Gertz involuntary public figure 
category until 1985, when the District of Columbia Circuit Court
( 9
directly faced the issue. See Dameron v. Washington Magazine_^ 
Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1141 
(1988). Dameron was an air traffic controller on duty when an 
airliner crashed, killing most of the passengers. See at
738. The crash drew a large amount of press coverage, and a 
large scale investigation into the reasons for the accident. See 
id. at 742. Authorities interviewed Dameron in the course of the 
investigation, and the press used his name frequently in reports 
on the accident. See id. The court found that through "sheer 
bad luck" and "no desire of his own" Dameron had become a public
V
figure on the limited subject of the accident, and was thus a 
rare example of an involuntary public figure. Id. at 742-43.
After Dameron, court findings of involuntary public figure 
status have been uncommon, with most of these courts relying on 
Dameron for support. See, e. q., Bay View Packing Co^—y_^—Taf 
543 N.W.2d 522, 532-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995.) Although the 
instances of cases holding a plaintiff to be an involuntary 
public figure are rare, there are several cases that apply the 
reasoning of Dameron. See, e.g., Naantaanbuu v.—Abernathy/
F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(Distinguishing Dameron in that 
Dameron had been dragged into the controversy from the start, 
whereas Naantaanbuu was dragged in 25 years latef). These courts 
adopt the reasoning of Dameron, while distinguishing on the basis 
of dissimilar facts. See, e.g» > id.
10
I
There is a second line of cases that hold plaintiffs to be 
limited purpose public figures. See, e.g., Wieqel v. Capital 
Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). These courts 
found that the plaintiffs had made affirmative actions that, 
although not intended to draw attention, inevitably led to 
attention because of the extraneous circumstances. See, e.g., 
id. at 50. The Wieqel court was faced with a situation in which 
the public controversy at issue was soil conservation and 
erosion. Wiegel was the owner of the largest local plot of
land. See id. The court found that it was inevitable for Wiegel 
to be involved in the public controversy, and held that he was a 
limited purpose public figure. See id. at 50-51. In Rosanova v. 
Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978), the court found 
Mr, Rosanova to be a limited purpose public figure because his 
actions, associating with known members of organized crime, were 
"bound to invite attention and comment." Id. at 861.
The difference between this line of cases and the Dameron 
holding is that these cases did not specifically find the 
plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures. See, e.g., Wj^egel, 
426 N.W.2d at 50. Rather, the courts found that the plaintiffs 
made affirmative acts bound to attract attention. See, _e., id. 
This shows the line between involuntary public figure status and 
the acts necessary to be a voluntary public figure to be quite 
narrow.
I 11
A different reasoning by several other courts supported 
findings of involuntary public figure status. See, e. g. /
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420 
(1988)(dissenting opinion), cert, dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 
(1989) . In Times Mirror, the court did not hold the plaintiff to 
be a public figure simply because she discovered the body of a 
murder victim. at 1433. However, the dissent argued that
the discovery of the body should have made the plaintiff an 
involuntary public figure. See id. at 1435. The dissent focuses 
on situations involving crime in saying "'[t]hose who commit 
crime or are accused of it may not only not seek publicity but
may make every possible effort to avoid it, but they are 
nevertheless persons of public interest.'" Id. at 1435 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. f (1965)). "'The same 
is true as to those who are the victims of crime or are so 
unfortunate as to be present when it is committed . . . [t]he 
persons are regarded as properly subject to the public interest 
and thus become involuntary public figures. Id.
Other courts have relied on the Restatement in finding their 
plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures. See, Sipple
v. Chronicle, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049 (1984). See also 
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert_. 
denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). Sipple grabbed the arm of a man who 
was attempting to assassinate President Ford, and the press 
praised Sipple as a hero. See Sipple, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043-
12
44. Several later articles referred to Sipple as both a hero and 
a proud gay man. See Sipple, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043-44. The 
Sipple court found the plaintiff to be an involuntary public 
figure using the logic found in the Restatement. Id. at 1049. 
Sipple became an involuntary public figure simply by being 
unfortunate to be present where a crime was attempted. See id.
These cases differ from Wieqel in that they specifically 
found their plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures. See id. 
Without relying on voluntary acts of the plaintiffs that 
inevitably led to attention, these courts found that the 
"involuntary public figure is passive and conducts no activities 
that could reasonably be held to invite public attention." 
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 
1988). Involuntary limited purpose public figures may have made 
voluntary acts that put them in a position that would draw 
attention, or they can be people who made no affirmative acts 
whatsoever.
Another much more expansive area of involuntary public 
figures include friends and family of public figures. See Carson 
v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1988). Although all 
the plaintiffs in Carson had stipulated to public figure status, 
the court stated that "one can assume that the wife of a public 
figure such as [Johnny] Carson more or less automatically becomes 
at least a part-time public figure herself." Id. at 210.
Several courts have held that relatives of famous people are one
13
true group of involuntary public figures. See, e.g., Marcone v.
^ Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 (3d Cir.
1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); also Carlisle
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733 (1962),
, Although wives of famous people may have taken an affirmative
action, children of famous people have not. In spite of this, 
several courts have held children of famous people to be 
involuntary public figures. See, e.g. , Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 
Cal. 3d 20, 37-8 (1969) .
Another court held that a close friend of Elizabeth Taylor
V
was a limited purpose public figure. See Wynberg v. National 
Enquirer, 564 F. Supp. 924, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In Wynberg, 
the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure relative to the 
issue of his relationship with Elizabeth Taylor because he had 
been "dragged unwillingly into a public controversy." Thus,
involuntary public figure status can be sustained merely on the 
plaintiffs relationship with a famous person. Khawar's voluntary 
.actions drew him into the public spotlight, strengthening his 
status as an involuntary limited purpose public figure.
^* Khawar's presence and conr^f> of action on the
night Robert Kennedy was a^^sassinated made 
Khawar one of the rare cas<a<; of an involuntary 
public figure. ^ ------------------
Khalid Khawar could be an involuntary public figure just 
from the unfortunate circumstance of having been photographed 
within a few feet of Robert Kennedy just moments before the 
assassination. Khawar was extremely close to one of the most
i (
14
Even absent the intentional actions on Khawar's part, he had 
been dragged into the public spotlight. It was Khawar in a 
picture in Time that would be etched into the minds of countless 
Americans, standing a few feet from Robert Kennedy just before 
the assassination. (R.T. 1392.) Khawar was unfortunate to be 
present when a crime of such magnitude was committed. Even if 
this Court ignores all of the affirmative actions taken by
V
Khawar, he has become an involuntary public figure.
However, it is impossible to ignore the many affirmative 
actions that Khawar took on the night of the assassination.
Khawar gave his camera to a friend and intentionally got as close 
to Kennedy on the podium as possible in order to have his picture 
taken with the Senator. (R.T. 1339-40.) Khawar's friend 
succeeded in taking the picture moments before the Senator was 
assassinated. (R.T. 1340.) This chain of affirmative actions, 
which eventually led to Khawar being dragged into a public 
controversy, is impossible to ignore. Khawar "voluntarily 
engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and 
comment." S^ Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861. Khawar's intentional 
actions "almost inevitably put him into the vortex of a public 
controversy." See McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 950 (3d 
Cir. 1985).
influential men of the time, just moments before that man was
assassinated (R.T. 1338.) Time magazine published a picture of
that moment for the entire country to see. (R.T. 1392.)
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Under the Wiegel analysis these intentional acts make Khawar 
a voluntary limited purpose public figure. There is little 
difference in the substance of the voluntary acts made by Khawar 
and those made by Wiegel. See Wiegel, 426 N.W.2d at 50.
Following the reasoning of Wiegel and Rosanova, Khawar has made 
substantial affirmative acts to become a voluntary limited 
purpose public figure. Id. at 50-51; Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861.
However, it would be hard for Khawar to have known what 
would happen shortly after he made these intentional acts. A 
better argument is that these affirmative actions strengthen 
Khawar's status as an involuntary public figure. Khawar was 
unfortunate to have been attempting to thrust himself in the line 
of the cameras aimed at Robert Kennedy just before the Senator 
was assassinated. Just as “Dameron happened to be the controller 
on duty at the time of the Mt. Weather crash," Damerori, 779 F.2d 
at 742, so Khawar happened to be photographed with Robert Kennedy 
on the night he was assassinated. (R.T. 1339.) Khawar did not 
inject himself into the controversy, but as the Dameron court 
stated, this "is not the be-all and end-all of public figure 
status , . . [p]ersons can become involved in public 
controversies and affairs without their consent or will."
Dameron, 779 F.2d at 740-41.
Khawar attempted to "thrust himself into the public eye" 
through his affirmative actions. Rudnick v. McMillan, 25 Cal. 
App. 4th 1183, 1190 (1994). There is no need to examine whether
16
Khawar was successful in this attempt, for "it is not necessary
to show that a plaintiff actually achieves prominence ... it is 
sufficient that ' [he] attempts to thrust himself into the public 
eye.'" Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 845-46 (1996) 
(quoting Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1190). In short, Khawar 
was unfortunate that he attempted to thrust himself into the 
public eye moments before the assassination. Therefore, Khawar 
was dragged involuntarily into becoming a public figure.
3. Under the Dameron analysis, Khawar is an
involuntary limited purpose public figure for
matters concerning the Kennedy assassination.
>•
The remarkable similarity of the facts involved in the case 
at bar with those existing in Dameron indicate that Khawar is an 
involuntary public figure. Both Dameron and Khawar were 
voluntarily at the places where the respective events occurred, 
and both were working. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741. Neither 
had anything to do with the respective incidents. See id. 
Authorities questioned both Dameron and Khawar, and the 
authorities cleared both of any wrong doing. See id. at 742.
The Dameron court distinguished its case from Time, Inc, v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), in which the Court determined 
that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure merely because of her 
highly publicized divorce proceedings. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 
454-55. The Firestone court rested its decision on the fact that 
just because the public was interested in her divorce, that did 
not make it a public controversy. Id. at 454. The Dameron court
17
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easily distinguished this case, because the situation involved in 
Dameron resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives in an airline 
accident. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742. The crash was a public 
controversy that Dameron had been drawn into. Likewise,
the death of Robert Kennedy is not a private matter. The 
assassination was a public controversy, and has remained so ever 
since. Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from 
Firestone for the same reasons discussed in Dameron.
The Dameron court also distinguished its facts from Wolston 
\T Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), in which the
------------ ~ V
plaintiff was found not to be a public figure for the libel 
claimed. Id. at 167. In Wolston the court found that the libel 
was not concerning the controversy for which the plaintiff could 
arguably have been a limited purpose public figure. I^ both
Dameron and the case at bar, the charges were concerning the 
respective public controversies that each had been drawn into.
See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.
The most intriguing similarity between Dameron and the case 
at bar is that the article involved in Dameron never mentioned 
Dameron's name. Id. The article published by Globe also never 
mentioned Khawar's name. (C.T. 3145.) The Dameron court noted 
I that 'Mi]f Dameron had not been previously linked with accounts
of the tragedy, no magazine reader could tie the alleged 
defamation to Dameron. Indeed it was partly because of the 




the oblique reference in The Washingtonian." Dameron, 779 F.2d 
at 742. The only reference to Khawar in the article published by 
Globe was a photograph over twenty years old which Morrow 
purported to be a picture of Ali Ahmand. (C.T. 3145.) The only 
way a reader could have connected the article to Khawar was if 
they had been exposed to the photograph before. This seems 
possible only if Khawar himself had shown the reader the same 
photograph in his office. Therefore Khawar could not have been 
identified in the article published by Globe without his own 
personal "attempts to thrust himself into the public eye."
V
Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1190.
4. The publication of Robert Morrow's book. The 
Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert F.
Kennedy, pulled Khawar into the public 
spotlight, making him an involuntary public
figure.
Courts have held people to be public figures simply because 
the press paid attention to them. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 
F.Supp. 29, 34 {S.D.N.Y. 1974), pet, denied, 508 F.2d 837 (2d 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). The Meeropol 
court stated that the plaintiffs had been in the public spotlight 
for much of their childhood. Id. "The activities of their 
parents were monitored by book, magazine and newspaper [sic] 
throughout the world. As children of famous parents, they 
achieved general fame or notoriety in the community." Id. The 
Meeropol court based its holding on the sole fact that the press 
had paid attention to the plaintiffs all of their lives. Id.
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The court stated its reasoning when it said even though they may 
have renounced the public spotlight by changing their name 
Meeropol, as children they were the subjects of considera 
public attention." Meeropol, 381 F. Supp. at 34. Therefore, it 
is possible to become an involuntary public figure through
other means than public attention.
Morrow's book was about a theory of how Robert Kennedy 
been assassinated. {C.T. 3145.) Twenty nine years have passed, 
but this event is still hotly debated and remains a public 
controversy. As discussed previously, Khawar s affirmative 
actions placed him in the controversy surrounding that fatal 
night. The publication of Morrow's book may have finally made 
Khawar an involuntary public figure, an event which had been 
inevitable from the actions Khawar took twenty years earlier.
This is not to say that Khawar had become a public figure 
and then ceased to be one because of a lapse of time, only to 
regain that status because of the publication of the book. 
"'[0]nce a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a 
matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his 
days.'" Forscher v. Buqliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 810 (1980)
{quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 418 
{I960)).
Khawar most likely became an involuntary public figure when 
Kennedy was assassinated, or shortly thereafter. If not, the 
publication of Morrow's book was the final step in drawing Khawar
20
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into the public spotlight, making him an involuntary limited 
purpose public figure. Through "sheer bad luck," or through a 
voluntary course of action that "inevitably put [him] into the 
vortex of a public controversy," Khalid Khawar has become an 
involuntary public figure for the limited purpose of the Kennedy 
assassination. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742-43; McDowell, 769 
F.2d at 950.
II. KHAWAR HAS NOT MADE THE NECESSARY SHOWING OF ACTUAL MALICE
TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
A. The question of whether there is sufficient evidence
to support an award of punitive damages in a libel
case must be reviewed de novo.
The United States Supreme Court created the requirement of 
proving actual malice in libel cases involving public officials. 
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
The Gertz court limited this holding to public figures, so that 
private figures did not have to show actual malice to recover in 
a libel action. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974). 
However, the Gertz court limited recovery in such cases to 
"compensation only for actual injury." Id. While the Gertz 
court left the states free to define their own standards of 
liability, it restricted the states from permitting "recovery of 
presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on" a 
showing of actual malice. Id.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court limited this 
holding to allow recovery of presumed or punitive damages in some 
situations. See Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc, v. Greenmoss Builders,
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Incw 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). The Court held that states could
allow awards of punitive and presumed damages without proof of 
actual malice when the plaintiff is a private individual and the 
libel at issue concerns a purely private matter. See Dunn & 
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
In the Dunn S Bradstreet case, the libel involved a credit 
report that was issued to very few people. at 749. Since
the credit report was not widely distributed and only concerned 
the plaintiff's financial information, this was a purely private 
matter. at 762. However, Khawar is making a claim regarding
V
an accusation that he is the assassin of Robert Kennedy. (C.T. 
139.) Regardless of the truth or falsity of such an accusation, 
the assassination of Robert Kennedy was and has continued to be a 
very public matter, and theories as to the possible assassin have 
been highly public matters. The assassination of a presidential 
candidate is not a purely private matter. Therefore, proof of 
actual malice is required to support an award of punitive 
damages. See Philadelphia Newspapers^—Inc. y_.—Hepps, 475 U.S. 
767, 775 (1986).
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of actual malice, the standard of review is ^ 
novo. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657, 685 (1989). Since courts cannot award punitive damages 
in libel actions without proof of actual malice, the standard of
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review for the award of punitive damages is also ^ novo. See 
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 685.
B. Khawar's evidence of actual malice is insufficient 
and the award of punitive damages must be reversed.
The Sullivan Court described actual malice as a statement 
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not." Sullivan^ 376 U.S. at 280. 
Courts have broken down the standard into either requiring a 
showing of ill will or hatred, or a showing that defendant acted 
with reckless disregard of the truth. See, e.g., Sanborn v. 
Chronicle Publ'g Co.,^18 Cal. 3d 406, 413 (1976).
Actual malice requires a stronger showing than mere 
negligence. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
The St. Amant court found that reckless disregard is not measured 
by the reasonable person standard, but rather the defendant must 
have "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of" the charges 
Id. Even an irresponsible and uncaring attitude, not rising to 
the level of ill will, is not enough to prove actual malice. See 
Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc., 610 A.2d 425, 430 (N.J. 
1992).
Khawar provided expert testimony claiming that the Globe 
reporter who wrote the story did not meet the professional 
standards of a reporter. (R.T. 831.) This is irrelevant 
however, as professional standards are not the controlling factor 
in libel cases. See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at 430. Careless and
irresponsible behavior that amounts to a breach of journalistic
standards is not even sufficient to present the issue of actual 
malice to the jury. See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at 430. In fact, 
"egregious deviation" from professional standards is only 
circumstantial evidence of actual malice. See Hinerman v.— 
Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 1992), cert, denied, 507 
U.S. 960 (1993).
Khawar also contends that Globe did not perform a thorough 
investigation into the assassination or the accusations made by 
Morrow. However, "mere proof of failure to investigate cannot 
establish actual malice. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332. S^ also
V
Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 188 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993). This evidence is irrelevant because it 
does not make the defendant any more likely to have had serious
doubts as to the truth of the statements. See St_._Amar^, 390
U.S. at 732-33, The Globe conducted an investigation. (R.T. 
1104-11, 1120-21.) The author interviewed Morrow in detail as to 
the claims made in his book, (R.T. 1104-11.)/ and attempted to 
contact the subject of the article, Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 1120-21.) 
Since failure to investigate cannot establish actual malice, the 
claim that the investigation was not thorough is not probative 
either. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732-33.
Khawar presented evidence that there was ample information 
available about the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and that 
anyone who wanted to inquire could have found the accusations to 
be without merit. (R.T. 690-702.) A plaintiff cannot prove
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actual malice by showing "that defendants failed to avail 
themselves of available means for ascertaining the falsity of the
statements." Varner v. Bryan, 440 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994). Again, this evidence does not attempt to establish that 
the defendants had serious doubts as to the truth of the 
statements in the article. See id. This evidence instead goes 
to the question of negligence, which is not probative of actual 
malice. See id.
At trial, Khawar argued that Globe did not make a sufficient 
attempt to contact him to get his side of the story. (R.T. 1120- 
21.) However, failure to contact the subject of a story is not 
actual malice, even where it would serve some purpose. See 
Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 715-17 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991). There is no 
requirement when publishing a story to get the subject's side.
See id. Globe made an attempt to contact the subject of the 
story. (R.T. 1120-21.) However, even if they didn't, they are 
under no duty to do so. See Reuber, 925 F.2d at 715-17. Failure 
to contact the subject of the story is at most a breach of 
journalistic professional standards, which makes it irrelevant 
towards the issue of actual malice. See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at 
430.
Khawar attempted to show many deficiencies in the quality of 
the reporting by Globe. (R.T. 690-702, 831, 1020-21, 1104-11.) 




only proved negligence on the part of Globe, rather than the 
reckless disregard required for actual malice. ^ Schwartz, 610 
A.2d at 430. Khawar failed to make any showing that could amount 
to actual malice, and therefore the award of punitive damages
must be reversed.
III. SINCE KHAWAR IS AN INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE TO PROVE ACTUAL MALICE ON THE PART OF GLOBE, 
DAMAGES SHOULD BE REVERSED.
AND HAS FAILED 
ANY AWARD OF
A public figure can not recover any damages without proving 
actual malice. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.., 475 U.S. 767, 
775 (1986). As previously discussed, a plaintiff cannot recover 
punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. Public 
figures cannot recover actual damages without this same showing 
of actual malice. See Curtis Publ'q Co. v. But^, 388 U.S 130,
154 (1967).
Khawar is an involuntary public figure. Since Khawar's 
complaints, if proved, would only amount to negligence, he has 
failed to prove actual malice. Therefore Khawar has not made the 
necessary showing to recover any damages against Globe. The 
judgment against Globe should thus be reversed.
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE IN
LIBEL ACTIONS.
The question whether to apply the neutral reportage 
privilege is a question of law. See_^ Hill v. City of Lon^
Beach, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1684 (1995) (holding that the issue of 
whether state law or contract principles applied to dismissal of 
civil employee is a question of law). On review, an appellate
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court is not bound by a lower court determination on questions of 
law. See Hill, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1687.
A. First Amendment free speech compels the adoption of the
neutral reportage privilege.
The United States Supreme Court first used constitutional 
free speech protections to limit state defamation law in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court held that 
even when a defendant's remarlcs are both false and defamatory, 
the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the remarks were made with actual malice or with reckless 
disregard for the truth when the remarks are directed at a public 
official. See id. at 279-80. The need to protect criticism of 
public officials and speech regarding issues of political concern 
motivated the decision. See id. at 271-72. Debate on matters of 
public concern "should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
. . . [although] it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials." Id. at 270.
Following Sullivan, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
articulated the neutral reportage privilege for the first time. 
See Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d 
Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co., 
434 U.S. 1002 (1977). The issue in Edwards was whether the New 
York Times was liable for publishing an article accurately 
reporting accusations made by the National Audubon Society. I^ 
at 117. Audubon Society officials alleged that five scientists 
were "paid liars" with regard to the effects of DDT on birds.
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Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117. The New York Times republished the 
accusations in the midst of a pre-existing public controversy 
Qver the use of DDT. See id. at 115.
On these facts, the Second Circuit found that the New York 
Times was constitutionally privileged against a libel judgment. 
See id. at 120, The court stated that "when a responsible, 
prominent organization like the National Audubon Society makes 
serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment 
protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those 
charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding 
their validity." Id. ^ The reasons the Second Circuit had for 
adopting the neutral reportage privilege echoed the concerns 
elucidated by the U.S. Supreme Court that debate on issues of 
public concern be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. The Second Circuit concluded that 
"[t]he public interest in being fully informed about 
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands 
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges 
without assuming responsibility for them." Edwards, 556 F.2d at 
120.
Subsequent to the Edwards case, the Second Circuit further 
defined the bounds of the neutral reportage privilege. See 
Cianci v. New Times Publ'q Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 {2d Cir. 1980). 
The court added a qualification that the privilege does not 
protect a reporter who "in fact espouses or concurs in the 
charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts these
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statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a public 
figure." Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.
Since the Second Circuit first adopted the neutral reportage 
privilege, other jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine on 
constitutional grounds. See, e.q., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. 
Supp. 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In a decision often cited by 
courts adopting the privilege, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California removed the requirement 
that the origin of the defamatory material be a responsible 
source. See id. The Barry case involved republished accusations 
by a professional basketball player against his former college 
coach. Id. at 1112. The player accused the coach of 
transferring money to the player in violation of NCT^ rules. See 
id. The federal district court reasoned that enforcing a 
requirement that the source of the accusation be responsible 
would be inconsistent with the primary reason behind the neutral 
reportage privilege. See id. at 1126.
The driving force behind the neutral reportage doctrine is 
the public interest in being informed. See id. Requiring 
reporters to ascertain the responsibility or trustworthiness of a 
source would have an impermissible chilling effect on the 
dissemination of information. See id. The relative 
trustworthiness of the original source is not important, as long 
as the report is neutral and accurate. See id. at 1126-27. 
Prominence is only important to the Barry court in so far as it 
allows the public to better judge the truth of the allegations. 
Id. at 1125-26. The court distinguishes a case in which the
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privilege did not apply because the accusers were unnamed, and 
therefore the public had no means of judging the veracity of the 
allegations. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1125-26. In Barry, the
court recognized that the public should be the judge of 
credibility in public controversies, and to that end, the neutral 
reportage privilege does not require the original source to be
responsible. Id. at 1126-27.
The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia went further than the court in Barry, and removed the 
requirement that the source of the charges be prominent. See In 
re United Press Int'i; 106 B.R. 323, 329 (D.D.C. 1989). "[A]
limitation to the reiteration of statements of 'responsible or 
'prominent' 'defamers' is inconsistent with the [reason for 
being] of the doctrine." Id * The charges in United—Press—Int—1 
concerned accusations by an ordinary citizen that the plaintiff 
was a leader of organized crime on the island of Hawaii, and the 
court held that United Press International was protected by the 
neutral reportage privilege. Id. at 323-25.
The United Press Int'I court reasoned that a prominence 
requirement was an assurance of trustworthiness, and relying on 
Barry, determined that trustworthiness is not a prerequisite to 
invoking the neutral reportage privilege. Id. at 330 n.l6. 
Requiring reporters to ascertain the veracity of their sources 
would chill speech on controversial issues. Bee Barry, 584 F. 
Supp. at 1126. A trustworthiness requirement, in the form of a 
prominent and responsible source, is inconsistent with the goal
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of open debate which is at the heart of the neutral reportage 
privilege. See United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. at 330.
In Barry, the court also reasoned that the neutral reportage 
privilege is constitutionally compelled due to the inadequate 
protection afforded by the actual malice requirement. Barry, 584 
F. Supp. at 1124. Pending defamation suits have a chilling 
effect on the press, and the quick resolution of such suits 
serves First Amendment free speech concerns. See id. Courts 
applying the neutral reportage privilege can resolve cases at the 
summary judgment stage, which lessens the chilling effect 
defamation actions have on free speech. See id. In contrast, 
the issue of actual malice must go to trial, see Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill, 120 n.9 (1979), thereby exacting a higher 
cost on First Amendment freedoms.
The neutral reportage doctrine addresses the United States 
Supreme Court's First Amendment concern for "uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open" debate on public issues. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
270. "If neutrality is maintained, the public . . . can serve as 
the final arbiter of the trustworthiness of the defamer and his 
statements . . . The First Amendment demands no less." United
Press Int'l, 106 B.R. at 330.
B. This Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege 
under the California Constitution.
Since the Second Circuit Edwards decision, a number of 
jurisdictions have adopted the neutral reportage privilege, 
including the Eighth Circuit, see Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 
F. 2d 1300 {8th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 883
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(1986), and many federal district courts. Se^ e^, Bar^,
F. Supp. at 1126. Other jurisdictions have rejected the 
privilege, see, e.g.. Young v. The Morning Journal, 669 N.E.2d 
1136 (Ohio 1996), or have not addressed the issue. Neither the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the United States Supreme 
Court have decided whether to apply the neutral reportage 
privilege.
Since the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the 
neutral reportage privilege, there is no binding precedent upon 
this Court. However, "the California Constitution provides 
independent protection for free speech and in certain contexts 
exceeds the protection provided by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution." Marcias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App.
4th 669, 675 (1997)(citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr^, 23 
Cal. 3d 899 (1979), aff^d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)). In Robir^, this 
Court recognized the right of citizens to collect signatures for 
a petition at a privately owned mall. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 910. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld this Court's decision, 
holding that states have the ability to adopt civil liberties in 
their own constitutions more expansive than the rights guaranteed 
in the United States Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.
v, Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
This Court stated that property rights must in certain 
circumstances yield to free speech rights. ^ Robins, 23 Cal.
3d at 906-08. In Robins, this Court acknowledged that [a] 
protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First 
Amendment is contained in our state constitutional guarantee of
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Robins> 23 Cal. 3d at 908the right of free speech and press.
(quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal, 3d 652, 658 (1975)). 
This Court recognized the importance of the right to petition in 
shaping the political and social landscape.
The neutral reportage privilege addresses the same concern 
for keeping citizens involved in public issues. In first 
articulating the doctrine, the Second Circuit cited the "public 
interest in being fully informed about controversies that often 
rage around sensitive issues." Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The 
"more definitive and inclusive" protection provided by the 
California Constitution, Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, must embrace 
these concerns, especially in light of the importance this Court 
put on the right of citizens to petition the government.
This Court recognized that property rights must give way to 
free speech rights in matters concerning the ability of the 
people to participate in our democracy. See Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 
at 906-08. Likewise, privacy rights must surrender to free 
speech rights in the context of the neutral reportage privilege. 
In a decision applying the neutral reportage privilege, the 
Illinois Court of Appeals noted the importance of free press to a 
free society, stating "[t]he ultimate sovereign in this country 
is an informed citizenry." Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, 
Inc., 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). This Court should 
uphold the role of the public to function as the ultimate 
sovereign, and should adopt the neutral reportage privilege under 
the broad free speech protections of the California Constitution.
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V.
A. The neutral reportage privilege protects Globe even 
nnder the stricter Second Circuit test if this Court 
finds that Khawar was a public figure.
Under the Second Circuit neutral reportage standard, a
report must meet a four part test for the privilege to apply.
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co.,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Cianci v. New Times Publ*g Co., 639 F. 2d
54, 69 (2d Cir. 1980). The requirements are that the plaintiff
is a public figure, the report is neutral and accurate, and the
V
source of the defamatory material is responsible and prominent. 
See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Additionally, the publisher must 
not concur in or espouse the charges. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 
69. If Khawar is a public figure for the limited purpose of the 
Kennedy assassination, the case at bar meets the other parts of 
this strict test.
Globe's publication meets the requirement that the report be 
neutral and accurate. The trial jury specifically found the 
article to be neutral and accurate, (C.T. 2782), and the record 
supports this finding. Fifteen of the eighteen paragraphs in the 
article contained language indicating that Morrow made the 
claims, one paragraph stated an undisputed fact, (C.T. 3145), and 
the remaining paragraphs of the report were direct quotations 
from Morrow or his book. (R.T. 1104.) The picture in the 
article was taken from Morrow's book, and the caption also 
ascribed the charges to Morrow. (C.T. 3145.) The article does
THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE APPLIES TO GLOBE S
REPUBLICATION OF MORROW'S CHARGES.
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not endorse Morrow's accusations, but merely republishes them.
"Unless it is shown that the journalist deliberately distorts 
[the charges] to launch a personal attack of his own , . . that 
which he reports under such circumstance is privileged." Krauss 
V. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1978). There is no evidence in the record that Globe distorted 
the charges Morrow made, and therefore the report is neutral and 
accurate.
Morrow was a responsible and prominent source with respect 
to the assassination of Robert Kennedy. The record shows that 
Morrow was a former CIA operative, (R.T. 809.) Morrow had 
published a previous book entitled Betrayal, concerning the 
assassination of John Kennedy, the publication of which made 
possible the creation of the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations. (R.T. 841.) The court in Edwards determined 
that the National Audubon Society was a prominent and responsible 
source concerning the controversy around DDT and birds. See 
Edwards 556 F.2d at 120. A federal district court found that a 
law firm with ties to the Greek-American community was a 
responsible and prominent source with regard to allegations 
against a Greek airline. Coliniatis v Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511,
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Likewise, Morrow was a prominent figure on 
the subject of assassinations, and he qualifies as a prominent 
and responsible source concerning Robert Kennedy's assassination.
Globe's report also meets the last prong of the test 
found in Cianci, that the author must not endorse the republished 
charges. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69. As previously discussed, every
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paragraph in the article attributes the charges to Morrow in some 
way. (C.T. 3145; R.T. 1104.) The Coliniatis court cited a 
similar factor in finding that a publisher did not endorse 
defamatory charges, stating that "[e]ven the headline of the 
article states that the allegations are made by 'lawyers of the 
company.'" Coliniatis, 965 F. Supp. at 516. Should this Court 
determine that Khawar was a public figure, Globe's report meets 
all parts of the strict Second Circuit test.
B. If Khawar is a limited purpose public figure—the
neutral reportage privilege protects Globe under the
standard articulated since the Barry ca^.
V
The Barry court and those which followed it applied the 
Second Circuit neutral reportage test, but without the 
requirement of a responsible and prominent source. Barry v.
Time, Inc., 584 F, Supp. 1110, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal- 1984). S^e 
also In re United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. 323, 329 (D.D.C. 1989). 
However, this line of cases included the requirement that the 
report must concern an existing newsworthy controversy. See 
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126. As previously discussed, the 
Globe's article was neutral and accurate, and Globe did not 
concur in or espouse the charges against Khawar. There was an 
existing, newsworthy controversy surrounding the assassination of 
Robert Kennedy, and should this court determine Khawar was a 
public figure, the Globe's report meets the test articulated in
Barry and its progeny.
Globe's report concerned a newsworthy controversy. In spite 
of the fact that a court convicted Sirhan Sirhan of Kennedy's
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assassination, (C.T. 3145,)# a live controversy existed 
concerning the assassination. The evidence in the record shows 
that Robert Blair Kaiser published a book questioning the 
circumstances of the Senator's death. (R.T. 1409.) Khawar 
testified that he had often seen himself on television in 
programs on the assassination. (R.T. 1393.) Robert Blair Kaiser 
testified at trial that he had attended a conference on the 
assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther 
King in 1993. (R.T. 2149.) Robert Kennedy was a United States
Senator, was running for president at the time of his death, and 
was a prominent public figure. These factors indicate there was 
a live controversy over Kennedy's assassination. The report 
meets the requirement that it be in the context of a newsworthy 
controversy, as well as the other parts of the post-Barry test.
C. Globe is protected under a broader privilege which does
not require the plaintiff to be a public figure.
Since the Second Circuit first articulated the neutral 
reportage privilege in Edwards, courts have applied it to cases 
involving private, as well as public figures. See, e.q., 
Coliniatis, 965 F. Supp. at 513-14. The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York held the neutral 
reportage privilege applicable in a case involving the employee 
of an airline. See id. The Coliniatis case concerned 
allegations that the plaintiff was involved in an illegal 
kickback scheme. Id. Although the court found that the 
plaintiff was a public figure for purposes of malice, it applied 
the neutral reportage privilege without regard to the public
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figure status of the plaintiff. See Coliniatis^ 965 F. Supp. at 
517-19.
The factors the Coliniatis court considered were whether the 
defamatory statement was "in the context of (1) 'an accurate and 
disinterested report; (2) regarding a newsworthy controversy; (3) 
in which the defamatory statement was made by a 'responsible, 
prominent organization'; and (4) provided the statement is not 
endorsed by the publisher." Id. at 519 {quoting Levin v. McPhee, 
917 F. Supp. 230, 239 {S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 119 F.3d 189 (2d 
Cir. 1997)). As previously discussed, Globe's report was neutral 
and accurate, and Morrow qualified as a prominent and responsible 
source. Additionally, there was a newsworthy controversy 
surrounding Kennedy's assassination, and Globe did not endorse 
the charges. Under this standard, Globe's republication of 
Morrow's charges is protected by the neutral reportage privilege.
CONCLUSION
Khalid Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel on the night of 
June 5, 1968, with the intention of having his picture taken near 
Robert Kennedy. After intentionally giving his camera to a 
friend he got up on the podium a few steps from the Senator where 
he posed for the camera. Shortly thereafter, Robert Kennedy was 
assassinated. Time published a photograph of Khawar standing 
near Robert Kennedy just before the assassination. Khawar showed 
this same photograph to thousands of people. Khawar's own 
actions combined with bad luck and the unfortunate circumstances 
of that night made Khawar an involuntary public figure.
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Because Khawar made no showing of actual malice, as a public 
figure he cannot recover on grounds of libel. Even if Khawar is
a private individual, his failure to prove actual malice
precludes recovery of punitive damages.
In addition this Court should adopt the neutral reportage
privilege, which is compelled by the United States and California 
Constitutions. This privilege protects Globe because its report 
was neutral and accurate, Khawar is an involuntary limited 
purpose public figure, and the charges concerned a newsworthy 
controversy.
The judgment against Globe on grounds of libel should be 
reversed and judgment entered in favor of Globe. Alternatively, 
any award of punitive damages must be reversed.
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